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Simple econometric tests reported in the literature consistently re-
port what appears to be a bias in inﬂation expectations. These results
are commonly interpreted as constituting evidence overturning the hy-
pothesis of rational expectations. In this paper, we investigate the
validity of such an interpretation.
The main tool utilized in our investigation is a computational dy-
namic general equilibrium model capable of generating aggregate be-
havior similar to the data along a number of dimensions. By construc-
tion, the model embedded the assumption of rational expectations.
Standard regressions run on equilibrium realizations of inﬂation and
inﬂation expectations nevertheless reveal an apparent bias in inﬂation
expectations. In these simulations, the null hypothesis of rational ex-
pectations is incorrectly rejected in a large percentage of cases; a result
that casts some doubt on conventional interpretations of the evidence.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
By various measures, inﬂation expectations appear to evolve sluggishly rela-
tive to actual inﬂation. In particular, expectations appear to underestimate
inﬂation during periods of rising inﬂation, and overestimate inﬂation dur-
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1ing periods of falling inﬂation.1 Related to this phenomenon is a stylized
fact documented by a sizable empirical literature that measured inﬂation
expectations appear to be empirically inconsistent with unbiasedness and ef-
ﬁciency.2 These results have sometimes been interpreted as evidence against
the rational expectations hypothesis.
In this paper, we question whether conventional econometric tests that
reject the unbiasedness of inﬂation expectations necessarily constitutes evi-
dence that rejects the rationality of inﬂation expectations. Our skepticism
in this matter was initially motivated by two facts. First, it seems that every
econometric test of rationality has been based on a relatively small sample
of data. Thus, it may be worthwhile to explore whether conventional tests
of rationality applied to small samples have any reasonable power. Second,
we know from the work of several authors that ‘sluggish’ (adaptive) expec-
tation formation may in fact be optimal (rational) in environments that
feature some type of ‘information friction;’ see Muth (1960), Brunner, et.
al. (1980), Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), Erceg and Levin (2003), and
Andolfatto, et. al. (2004). To the extent that information frictions are a
feature of reality, there is good reason to believe that even rational inﬂation
expectations may (in small samples) fail conventional tests of unbiasedness
and eﬃciency.
Our methodological approach to this issue is to run the conventional
econometric tests of unbiasedness on the artiﬁcial data generated by a con-
ventional business cycle model that embeds the rational expectations hy-
pothesis, and then report the frequency with which these tests reject the
null hypothesis of rational expectations (unbiased expectations). The strat-
egy followed here is similar to the one employed by Kozicki and Tinsley
(2001), who argue that frequent empirical rejections of the expectation hy-
pothesis of the term structure could be the result of individuals learning only
gradually about shifts in the objectives of the Federal Reserve. In earlier
contributions, Lewis (1988, 1989) uses a similar idea to examine whether
gradual learning might generate the ‘forward discount’ puzzle observed in
1For example, Dotsey and DeVaro (1995) ﬁnd that during the disinﬂation of 1980.1—
1983.3, expected inﬂa t i o ne x c e e d e da c t u a li n ﬂation in all but three periods using eight-
month-ahead forecasts, and in every period using one-year-ahead forecasts. Likewise,
Delong (1997) reports that during the U.S. inﬂationary episode of the 1970s, a consensus
private sector inﬂation forecast underestimated the actual inﬂation rate in every year and
that, remarkably, in each and every year inﬂation was actually expected to fall (Figure
6.9, pg. 267).
2See, for example, Thomas (1999), Roberts (1997), Croushore (1997), Mehra (2002),
and Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003).
2foreign exchange data.
The benchmark model we employ is the limited participation model de-
veloped by Christiano and Gust (1999). We extend their environment to
include a Taylor rule that is subject to relatively infrequent ‘regime shifts,’
which we model as occasional persistent shifts in the monetary authority’s
underlying long-run inﬂation target. As is standard, we also assume that
the interest rate is subject to transitory shocks, which are interpreted as
instances when the monetary authority wishes to deviate from its rule for
exogenous reasons (e.g., to react to the ﬁnancial market developments). In
the spirit of Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), we assume that our model
agents cannot separately observe these two shocks. Instead, market partic-
ipants must make rational inferences based on the limited information at
their disposal. This signal extraction problem gives rise to a learning rule
that shares some features with adaptive expectations processes.
Our prior for this exercise was that conventional econometric tests of
rationality would incorrectly reject the null hypothesis of rationality on a
frequent basis and that the reason for this high rejection rate would lie in
the nature of the information friction concerning the conduct of monetary
policy. As it turns out, we were only partly right.
As expected, we ﬁnd that standard econometric tests of unbiasedness
using simulated data frequently and incorrectly reject the null hypothesis.
Furthermore, the frequency of rejection falls steadily as the sample size
of each simulation is increased. These results conﬁrm our conjecture that
conventional econometric tests of rationality are not very powerful in small
samples.
When we repeated the experiment in the context of an environment with
no signal extraction problem, the number of rejections fell signiﬁcantly. But
surprisingly, the rejection rate did not fall dramatically as expected. Ev-
idently, it appears that the high rate of rejection may be attributable to
several factors, one of which may be the information friction alluded to
above. But an even more important factor may simply be the relatively
short sample periods utilized by econometricians, in conjunction with the
relatively persistent behavior of inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. Ex-
tending the sample period of simulations and altering the monetary policy
rule to induce less persistence generated far fewer rejections of the null in
our experiments.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the
type of evidence that is used to show that measured inﬂation expectations
3fail simple unbiasedness tests. Section 3 develops the model used in our sim-
ulations. Section 4 describes the model’s calibration and Section 5 provides
a brief evaluation of the model’s dynamics. Section 6 presents our Monte
Carlo simulations along with our interpretations. Section 7 oﬀers a brief
summary and conclusion.
2 Empirical Evidence on Inﬂation Expectations
Survey data represent one of the tools commonly used to identify economic
agents’ inﬂation expectations.3 Figure 1 illustrates a typical path for such
data. It depicts the (mean) forecast for one-year-ahead inﬂation, as mea-
sured by the Livingston Survey, as well as the inﬂation rate that eventually
prevailed. 4 The ‘sluggishness’ of inﬂation expectations alluded to above is
clearly visible in the ﬁgure. That is, note how inﬂation expectations appear
to lag (and underestimate) the actual inﬂa t i o nr a t ei nt h ee a r l yp a r to ft h e
sample, which is characterized by generally rising inﬂation. Likewise, inﬂa-
tion expectations appear to lag (and overestimate) the actual inﬂation rate
over the latter part of the sample, which is characterized by generally falling
inﬂation.
Several studies (e.g., Mankiw et. al. 2003, Mehra 2002, Thomas 1999,
Roberts 1997, and Croushore 1997) assess whether economic agents make
systematic errors when forecasting inﬂation, i.e. whether measured inﬂation
expectations are rational. These studies commonly emphasize one key char-
acteristic of rationality; namely, if inﬂation expectations are rational, they
should be unbiased.5 Testing for unbiasedness is typically implemented by
running the following regression:
3Other methods make use of futures market data (Dotsey and DeVaro, 1995) or the
yield diﬀerences between non-indexed and indexed Treasury bills (Shen and Corning,
2001).
4The Livingston survey is maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia;
its history and current structure are described in Croushore (1997). Other survey data
on U.S. inﬂation expectations include those in the survey of households conducted by
the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and the more recently
established Survey of Professional Forecasters, also maintained by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia.
5Some studies also attempt to verify whether inﬂation expectations are eﬃcient by
testing whether any information publicly available at the time the forecasts were made
could reduce expectational errors.
4πt = a0 + a1Et−k [πt]+et; (1)
where πt is the net annualized rate of inﬂation and Et−k [πt] is a measure of
the inﬂation rate expected for date t, with the expectation formed at date
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Inflation and Expected Inflation
(Livingston Survey)
Actual inﬂation: Y/Y increase in all-items CPI. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. Expected inﬂation: One-Year Ahead (Mean) Estimate from the Livingston
Survey. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Typically (though not always), the hypothesis of unbiasedness tends to
be rejected, particularly in small samples; in larger samples, the hypothesis is
5rejected less often. For example, Table 1 reports Thomas’ (1999) regression
results using the Livingston data. These results have been updated and
conﬁrmed by Mehra (2002). Table 1 shows that unbiasedness is rejected
decisively in various subsamples, but not rejected in the full sample.
TABLE 1
Testing for Unbiasedness
ˆ a0 ˆ a1 χ2(2) Signiﬁcance
1960.1—1980.2 0.62 1.29 18.11 0.000
1980.3—1997.4 0.13 0.88 9.37 0.009
1960.1—1997.4 0.13 1.12 2.30 0.317
This pattern of frequent rejections of the null in small samples but less
frequent rejections in larger samples is consistent with the thesis of the
present paper: incomplete information and learning about a few signiﬁcant
shifts in monetary policy (among other factors) can lead the expectations of
rational agents to appear biased.6
3M o d e l
This section presents the model used to perform our experiments. We de-
scribe the optimization problem of households, ﬁrms, and ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries, as well as the policy rule followed by the monetary authority.
In addition, we provide a detailed description of the shifts that aﬀect this
rule and the learning of private agents about these shifts. The key assump-
tion is that changes in the inﬂation target of monetary authorities cannot
be observed directly by private agents and must instead be inferred using
observed inﬂation outcomes.
The model belongs to the class of limited participation models, as in-
troduced by Lucas (1990). This class of model assumes that households
are relatively slow to adjust their nominal savings in response to monetary
policy shocks. As a result, monetary injections aﬀect the loanable funds
of banks and thus the supply of credit to ﬁrms, with consequent eﬀects on
economic activity. Christiano and Gust (1999) and Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (1997, 1998) demonstrate that this class of models can replicate
6This possibility is also discussed in Thomas (1999) and Mehra (2002).
6the main dynamic eﬀects of monetary policy shocks. In particular, even
though prices are not sticky by assumption, smooth movements in prices
can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon.
3.1 Household Sector
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical, inﬁnitely-lived house-




βtU(ct,n t + ht), (2)
where ct denotes consumption, nt denotes employment, ht represents the
time-cost associated with portfolio adjustment, and 0 <β<1 denotes a
subjective discount factor.
At the beginning of period t, a household possesses Mt dollars which
is divided between (liquid) cash Mc
t and (illiquid) interest-bearing deposits
Md
t ; i.e., Mt = Mc
t +Md
t . The allocation of money across cash and deposits
is ‘sticky’ in the sense of being ﬁxed during period t (i.e., having been deter-
mined during period t − 1). At the beginning of the period, the household
earns Wtnt dollars in the labor market and so has Mc
t + Wtnt dollars avail-
able to make purchases of consumption ct and new capital goods xt; i.e.,
assume the following cash-in-advance constraint:
Pt (ct + xt) ≤ Mc
t + Wtnt, (3)
where Pt denotes the period t price level.
Households own the economy’s capital stock kt, w h i c ht h e yr e n tt oﬁrms
at the real rental rate rt. Assume that capital depreciates at rate 0 <δ<1,
so that kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + xt. Let Rt denote the gross nominal interest rate
earned on cash deposits Md
t and let Dt denote the nominal dividend income
that a household earns through its ownership of the ﬁnancial sector. At
the end of the period, households receive their capital rental and dividend
income, and their return on deposits. These revenues, combined with any
liquid assets remaining subsequent to their goods purchases sum up to their
end-of-period ﬁnancial wealth, which is then divided between next period’s
liquid and illiquid assets; i.e.,
Mc
t+1 + Md
t+1 = Ptrtkt + RtMd
t + Dt +[ Mc
t + Wtnt − Ptct − Ptxt]. (4)
7O b s e r v et h a tt h et e r mi nt h es q u a r eb r a ckets above will equal zero whenever
the cash-in-advance constraint (3) binds.
Following Christiano et. al. (1998), Christiano and Gust (1999) and
Aiyagari and Braun (1998), we assume that adjusting the household wealth
portfolio is costly, but not inﬁnitely so. The purpose of this assumption is
to generate persistence in the liquidity eﬀect following a shock to monetary









where H(.) is an increasing and convex function.
Thus, the household’s choice problem involves choosing a stochastic
process
©




t=0 to maximize expected utility (2)
subject to (3), (4), (5) and initial conditions k0,Mc
0,Md
0. Note that the ex-
pectations operator in (2) represents an expectation that is based on all
available information to the household. As we will discuss in further de-
tail below, the speciﬁcation of E0 will vary depending on the information
structure we assume.
3.2 Business Sector
The business sector consists of goods-producing ﬁrms and ﬁnancial interme-
diaries. Firms produce output yt using capital kt and labor nt a c c o r d i n gt oa
standard neoclassical production function yt = atF(kt,n t). The technology
parameter at evolves according to:
lnat =( 1− ρ)lna + ρlnat−1 + vt,
with vt ∼ N(0,σ2
v) and 0 <ρ<1. Assume that vt is realized at the beginning
of the period.
Firms rent capital and labor from households. Capital is paid in the usual
way; i.e., with claims to the output produced within the period. However,
following the literature, we assume that households demand to be paid up-
front in government cash. Because ﬁrms begin each period with no cash, they
must borrow the necessary funds from ﬁnancial intermediaries. Assuming
that ﬁrms borrow just enough cash to ﬁnance the period wage bill, the
amount borrowed will equal Wtnt dollars. If the loan is payable at the end
of the period, then the total owing at that time is equal to RtWtnt, where
8Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate on cash loans. In this case, the
ﬁrm’s period proﬁt function is given by:
PtatF(kt,n t) − Ptkt − RtWtnt. (6)
Note that because workers must be paid in borrowed cash, the nominal
interest rate here serves as a type of tax on production. In this way, an
unexpected increase in the nominal interest rate has the potential to depress
economic activity.
Financial intermediaries accept money deposits Md
t from households and
extend money loans Wtnt to ﬁrms. If intermediation is costless, then compe-
tition dictates that the interest rate charged on loans and earned on deposits
will be equated to some common value Rt. We assume that Rt is determined
in a competitive market for money loans, but that this interest rate can be
inﬂuenced (and if desired, entirely determined) by the central bank through
injections (or withdrawals) of new cash Xt accruing to intermediaries.
Thus, intermediaries generate end-of-period revenues equal to Rt(Md
t +
Xt) and end-of-period expenses (deposit repayments) equal to RtMd
t , for a
net proﬁte q u a lt oDt = RtXt. These proﬁts are remitted to households at
the end of the period as a dividend payment.
3.3 Monetary Policy
The monetary authority sets the net nominal interest rate it ≡ Rt − 1
according to the following Taylor rule:
it =( 1− θ)[r∗ + π∗
t + λ(πt − π∗
t)+γ(yt − y∗)] + θit−1 + ut, (7)
where r∗ denotes the steady-state real (net) interest rate, π∗
t denotes an inﬂa-
tion target, y∗ denotes the steady-state level of GDP, and ut denotes an ex-
ogenous transitory monetary policy shock. The parameter 0 ≤ θ<1 indexes
the degree to which the monetary authority wishes to smooth out interest
rate movements. As mentioned above, the monetary authority achieves any
particular it with an appropriate lump-sum injection/withdrawal of cash Xt
to/from intermediaries.
We assume that the monetary policy rule is subject to two types of
disturbances. The ﬁrst disturbance consists of the monetary policy shocks
ut deﬁned above. We interpret these shocks as the reaction of monetary
authorities to economic factors, such as ﬁnancial stability concerns, not ar-
ticulated by the rule (7). Alternatively, the shocks could be understood
9as stemming from the imperfect control exercised by monetary authorities
over the growth rate of money supply. Under either interpretation, we view
these shocks as possessing little persistence. Accordingly, we assume that
their evolution is governed by the following process:
ut = φ1ut−1 + et, (8)
with 0 ≤ |φ1| << 1 and et ∼ N(0,σ2
e).
The second disturbance to monetary policy is as follows. We assume that
the inﬂation target of the monetary authorities π∗
t, while remaining constant
for extended periods of time, is nevertheless subject to occasional, persistent
shifts. We see two possible interpretations for these shifts. First, they could
correspond to changes in economic thinking that lead monetary authorities
to modify their views about the proper rate of inﬂation to pursue. Delong
(1997), for example, argues that the Great Inﬂation of the 1970s, and its
eventual termination by the Federal Reserve at the beginning of the 1980s,
was a result of shifting views about the shape of the Phillips curve and, more
generally, about the nature of the constraints under which monetary policy
is conducted. Alternatively, a change in the inﬂation target could reﬂect the
appointment of a new central bank chair, whose preferences over inﬂation
outcomes diﬀer from their predecessor’s. Under either interpretation, we
view these shifts as exhibiting signiﬁcant duration, in the order of ﬁve to
ten years.
We express these shifts with the variable zt ≡ π∗
t −π∗, so that zt consti-
tutes the deviation of the current target of authorities π∗
t from its long term
(time-invariant) mean π∗. We assume that the following process, a mixture





st w.p. 1 − φ2,s t ∼ N(0,σ2
s);
(9)
with 0 << φ2 < 1.
Notice that the process for zt shares some similarities with a random
walk. Speciﬁcally, the conditional expectation of zt is close to zt−1 when
φ2 is close to one. In contrast with a random walk however, the process is
not aﬀected by innovations every period and is stationary. The process also
diﬀers from a standard autoregressive process in that the decay of a given
impulse will be sudden and complete, rather than smooth and gradual. We
10believe that this characterization of the regime shifts accords well with recent
episodes of monetary history and with our suggested interpretations of these
shifts.
3.4 Information Structure and Learning
In our experiments below, we consider two information structures, distin-
guished by whether agents can directly observe the inﬂation target π∗
t or
not. We refer to the case in which individuals do observe π∗
t as complete in-
formation; and the case in which they do not as incomplete information.I n
both cases, agents are assumed to understand the structure of monetary pol-
icy in the sense they know the underlying parameters (θ,λ,γ,φ1,φ 2,σe,σs)
governing the policy rule (7).
The assumption of complete information supposes that the monetary
authority is willing and able to communicate changes in its inﬂation target.
However, credibly communicating such shifts might be diﬃcult for several
reasons. For example, although a new central bank head may make a strong
aversion for inﬂation known in public announcements, the lack of precision
of these announcements may leave private agents uncertain as what they
imply quantitatively for the inﬂation target. Agents might, as a result,
modify their beliefs about the inﬂation target of monetary authorities only
once several periods of lower inﬂation have been observed. More explicit
announcements of changes in the inﬂation target might also suﬀer, at least
initially, from similar credibility problems.
When agents have incomplete information, they only observe a mixture
of the two shocks zt and ut, so that π∗
t is not directly observable. To illus-
trate the nature of the signal extraction problem in this case, consider the
following sequence of events. Suppose that initially, the inﬂation target is
set to its long-term mean; i.e., π∗
0 = π∗. At any date t>0 then, the interest
rate is given by:
it =( 1− θ)[r∗ + π∗ + λ(πt − π∗)+γ(yt − y∗)] + θit−1 + ut. (10)
Now, suppose that at some time t>0, the monetary authority changes its
inﬂation target to some other value π∗
t 6= π∗, so that the interest rate now
satisﬁes:
it =( 1− θ)[r∗ + π∗
t + λ(πt − π∗
t)+γ(yt − y∗)] + θit−1 + ut.
This latter equation can be expressed as:
it =( 1− θ)[r∗ + π∗ + λ(πt − π∗)+γ(yt − y∗)] + θit−1 +  t, (11)
11where  t ≡ (1 − θ)(1 − λ)zt + ut and zt ≡ (π∗
t − π∗).
Comparing equations (10) and (11) shows that from the perspective of
an agent whose initial belief about the inﬂation target was π∗, the observed
shock to the policy rule  t is a combination of the regime shift (1−θ)(1−λ)zt
and the transitory shock ut. The signal extraction that agents face therefore
entails separating  t into its persistent and transitory components. Having
solved this problem, agents can then back out an estimate of the shift in the
inﬂation target zt =( π∗
t − π∗).
In the case of incomplete information, we assume that agents use a
Kalman ﬁlter to solve the signal extraction problem. Note that the dis-
turbances to monetary policy zt and ut, along with the observed shock to






























(1 − φ2) w.p. φ2;
st+1 − φ2zt w.p. 1 − φ2.
Observe that under this deﬁnition, Etκt+1 =0 .
The system deﬁned in (12) along with the speciﬁcation of et and κt
deﬁne a state-space system (Hamilton, 1994, Chapter 13), where the ﬁrst
equation in (12) is the state equation and the second equation in (12) is the
observation equation. When applied to such a system, the Kalman ﬁlter
delivers estimates of the two unobserved states (zt and ut) conditional on
all observed values of  t up to and including period t. These estimates are










+ Kt ( t − Et−1 t),
where Kt represents the gain matrix of the ﬁlter and governs the extent to
which unexpected movements in the observed shock  t are attributed to the
persistent shift zt or to the transitory shock ut. The system in (12) can then






















The projections arising from the Kalman ﬁlter represent the best linear
forecasts of the unobserved variables based on available information. How-
ever, since zt is not normally distributed (conditional on information up to
date t) but is instead a mixed Bernouilli-normal variate, the Kalman ﬁlter
is not optimal.7 This implies that agents using this ﬁlter are not strictly
rational and could potentially improve on their forecasts of future mone-
tary policy disturbances by using another (signiﬁcantly more complicated)
non-linear ﬁlter. We performed a number of tests to check whether this
source of ‘non-rationality’ was likely to be quantitatively important in the
experiments performed below. it turns out that in repeated simulations of
the model, the instances where agents could have actually improved their
forecasts in a statistically signiﬁcant manner are not frequent.8
3.5 Equilibrium





t=0, a price system {Pt,W t,R t,r t}∞
t=0 and monetary
injections {Xt}∞





1. The allocation maximizes (2) subject to (3), (4), (5);
2. The allocation maximizes (6) and Dt = RtXt;
3. Monetary injections {Xt}∞
t=0 are consistent with (7);
4. Markets clear at each date; i.e., ct +kt+1 = atF(kt,n t)+(1−δ)kt and
Md
t + Xt = Wtnt; and
7When one considers that the only source of variation in zt arises from a normal
variable, it must be that in an unconditional sense, zt is distributed normally. Considering
however the high values of φ2 used in our calibration, this normal behavior will only appear
after a large number of data have been observed.
8As our main results do not depend critically on the learning mechanism, for the sake
of brevity, we omit describing our investigation of this issue. For the interested reader,
details of our tests are available on request.
135. Expectations are consistent with the stochastic process generated by
{at,z t,u t}∞
t=0 and optimal behavior, given available information.
4C a l i b r a t i o n
We solve the model by linearly approximating policy and pricing functions
around the nonstochastic steady state; see King and Watson (1998). Nomi-
nal variables are transformed in the usual way to render them stationary.
4.1 Preferences and Technology
The model is calibrated to quarterly data and assign standard values for the
discount factor β =0 .99 and depreciation rate δ =0 .025. The production
function is Cobb-Douglas F(k,n)=kαn1−α, with α =0 .36. The scale para-
meter for the technology shock is set to a =1and the persistence parameter
is set to ρ =0 .95. The standard deviation of the innovations to technology
is set to σv =0 .0035, so that the variance of simulated GDP corresponds
roughly with observation.
Following Christiano and Gust, preferences are parameterized according
to:







As is well-known, this speciﬁcation of preferences implies that time alloca-
tion is independent of wealth; see also Greenwood, et. al. (1988). We set
ψ1 =0 .4, which implies a (steady-state) wage elasticity of labor supply of
2.5; the value used by Christiano and Gust (1999). The scale parameter ψ0
is set to 2.15, so that employment is normalized to unity in the steady-state.
Following Aiyagari and Braun (1998), the portfolio adjustment cost func-














In a steady-state, the cash balances grow at the rate of inﬂation so that
h∗ =0 . We set the adjustment cost parameter to τ =1 5 , which corresponds
roughly to the speciﬁcation in Christiano et. al. (1998) and Christiano and
Gust (1999). In an economic sense, adjustment costs turn out to be small
in the sense that in our simulations, they never exceed 0.1% of steady-state
GDP or hours.
144.2 Monetary Policy
The long-run inﬂation rate is set to π∗ =0 .0123, which implies an annual
inﬂation rate of 5% in the steady-state. According to the monetary policy
rule (7), the nominal interest rate reacts to deviations of inﬂation from its
current target (λ), to deviations of output from its trend (γ), and to its own
lagged value (θ). Calibrating these values turns out to be not so straightfor-
ward since the sizable literature on this subject reports estimates of Taylor
rules using a wide variety of speciﬁcations and methods.9 Furthermore, some
parameter combinations lead to non-uniqueness (or nonexistence) of stable
equilibria; see Christiano and Gust (1999). Nevertheless, the literature can
be used to restrict the parameter space in a plausible way.
Beginning with Taylor (1993), it has been argued that the interest rate
must react aggressively to inﬂation to avoid the possibility of ‘expectation
traps’ in which high inﬂation becomes a self-fulling prophesy. Accordingly,
we set λ =2in our benchmark calibration. This value is only slightly larger
that the value used by Taylor and is in line with recent empirical estimates;
see Erceg and Levin (2003), English et. al. (2003), and Schorfheide (2003).
We analyze the sensitivity of our results for λ ∈ [2,4].
Similarly, we set the benchmark smoothing parameter to θ =0 .50, which
is in the range of recent empirical estimates; again, see Erceg and Levin
(2003), Kozicki and Tinsley (2003), and Schorfheide (2003). Note that these
empirical exercises allow for the possibility of within-sample regime shifts in
monetary policy and so are consistent with our environment.
The parameter γ governs the response of the interest rate to changes
in the output gap. For our benchmark calibration, we set γ =0 .25, which
is lower than most other empirical estimates, but consistent with the value
obtained in Erceg and Levin (2003). We explore the sensitivity of our results
for γ ∈ [0,0.25]. Higher values of γ are avoided since they increase the
likelihood of multiple equilibria; see Christiano and Gust (1999).
The parameters φ2 and σs govern the dynamics of the inﬂation target zt.
The parameter φ2 governs the mean duration of any given regime. In our
benchmark calibration, we set φ2 =0 .975, which implies a mean duration
of about 10 years. This value is consistent with our earlier interpretation
9Empirical estimates of Taylor rules diﬀer on whether the estimated rule is forward
looking (Clarida et. al., 2000) or is based solely on contemporaneous variables (Taylor,
1993); and whether parameters are obtained by single-equation estimation (Erceg and
Levin 2003, English, et. al. 2003), or as part of a system-wide estimation (Schorfheide
2003, Kozicki and Tinsley, 2003).
15of regimes corresponding to particular central bank heads or the life of a
particular economic paradigm that dominates FOMC committee decisions.
It is also in line with the estimates reported in Erceg and Levin (2003) and
Schorfheide (2003).
The parameter σs represents the standard deviation of the distribution
from which a regime shift is drawn when it occurs. We set σs =0 .01, which
implies that a one standard deviation policy shift changes the inﬂation target
by 4% on an annual basis. Again, this value is consistent with the empirical
results reported in Erceg and Levin (2003), Kozicki and Tinsley (2003), and
Schorfheide (2003).
The parameters governing the transitory monetary policy shock are set
to (φ1,σe)=( 0 .10,0.005). The low persistence of these shocks is consistent
with our interpretation that they represent temporary deviations from the
policy rule in place. The standard deviation is at the high end of estimates
reported elsewhere in the literature. Sensitivity analysis reveals that our
main conclusions are robust to diﬀerent values for these parameters within
a reasonable range.
5M o d e l E v a l u a t i o n
In this section, we provide a brief evaluation of the model by reporting
a set of conventional (RBC) second moments and some impulse response
functions. Table 1 reports three statistics for a set of variables x. The ﬁrst
column records the percent standard deviation of variable x; the second
column records the standard deviation of variable x relative to GDP; and
the third column records the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of variable x. These




Selected Variables and Moments
Variable (x) σ(x) σ(x)/σ(y) ρ(x)
GDP 1.68 1.00 0.63
Consumption 1.30 0.78 0.57
Investment 2.98 1.77 0.69
Employment 1.59 0.95 0.58
Real Wage 0.63 0.38 0.58
Inﬂation 0.61 0.37 0.14
Expected Inﬂation 0.28 0.17 0.66
Technology 0.70 0.42 0.69
The main thing to take away from Table 1 is that the model’s dynamic
properties are more or less consistent with the data and standard monetary
business cycle models; e.g., see Cooley and Hansen (1995). As with most
monetary models, monetary shocks contribute very little to the volatility
of real variables. Note that the model appears to embed a quantitatively
important propagation mechanism in the sense that the volatility of the
technology shock is signiﬁcantly less than the volatility in GDP. As well,
note that expected inﬂation is considerably more stable and persistent than
actual inﬂation.
Figure 2 records the economy’s response to a standard deviation decline
in the inﬂation target. This type of regime change initially generates a sub-
stantial and persistent increase in the interest rate, which is consistent with
what we know of such episodes (Erceg and Levin 2003). In our model, such
a shock also generates a mild recession. Note that inﬂation falls gradually,
with inﬂation expectations consistently overestimating actual inﬂation for
several periods. In the long-run, however, such a policy change results in
lower interest rates and higher GDP (recall that the interest rate here acts


























Figure 3 records the economy’s response to a standard deviation increase
in the technology shock. As is standard in these environments, the sudden
surge in output is disinﬂationary. While the monetary policy rule calls
for a higher interest rate as output rises above normal levels, the drop in
inﬂation initially requires a signiﬁcant infusion of liquidity (i.e., a decline
in the interest rate) to stabilize inﬂation around its target level. Evidently,
this latter eﬀect dominates the former. Note that expected inﬂation deviates
from actual inﬂation for only one period following the shock. The subsequent























Dynamics Following a Positive
Technology Shock
Our basic conclusion is that the model’s dynamics are not unreasonable.
To the extent that this is true, the model can serve as a useful laboratory
for the experiment that follows.
6 Testing the Unbiasedness Hypothesis
6.1 The Experiment
We treat our benchmark model as the data generating process (DGP) and
ask what an econometrician would conclude about the unbiasedness of in-
ﬂation expectations if presented with data from our DGP.
19To this end, we simulate the model 1000 times, generating realizations
for inﬂation and expected inﬂa t i o n8 0p e r i o d s( 2 0y e a r s )i nl e n g t hf o re a c h
simulation. Because measured inﬂation expectations are often based on
one-year ahead forecasts, we record two sets of results based on one-quarter
ahead and year-over-year forecasts. In addition, we report results for both
the complete and incomplete information environments inn order to evaluate
the impact of the information frictions stressed above.
For each simulation, we estimate equation (1) and record the parame-
ter estimates ˆ a0,ˆ a1 and test the null hypothesis H0 :( ˆ a0,ˆ a1)=( 0 ,1). For
one-quarter ahead expectations, the residuals in equation (1) are not seri-
ally correlated under the null and the standard χ2 test statistic is valid.
However, with year-over-year expectations, the sample observations overlap
because the frequency of the data is quarterly while the forecast horizon
is one year. To correct for the serial correlation induced by this overlap,
an HAC-robust variance-covariance matrix with a uniform window of three
lags is constructed for the residuals. This procedure follows Diebold and
Mariano (1995) and Hansen and Hodrick (1980) as well as Thomas (1999).
Finally, we also record the fraction of the simulations for which the test
statistic rejects H0 at a signiﬁcance level lower than 5%. When the null
hypothesis is true and the test is correctly speciﬁed, this fraction should be
close to 5%, the theoretical size of the test. We interpret results where this
fraction is signiﬁcantly higher than 5% as evidence suggesting that simple
tests of unbiasedness constitute a poor test of the rational expectations
hypothesis.
6.2 Results
Our results for the benchmark calibration are reported in Table 2. The ﬁrst
two columns record the median (over 1000 simulations) parameter estimates
for the regression equation (1), while the last column records the fraction of
times the null hypothesis is rejected over 1000 simulations.
20Table 2
Parameter Estimates and Hypothesis Tests
ˆ a0 ˆ a1 Rejection
(Median) (Median) Rate for H0
One-quarter Forecast
Complete Info 0.0008 0.8924 12.5%
Incomplete Info 0.0014 0.8369 17.1%
Four-quarter Forecast
Complete Info 0.0017 0.8091 34.0%
Incomplete Info 0.0021 0.7585 38.1%
As we expected, the rejection rate for H0 in the incomplete information
environment is considerably higher than 5% for both the one-quarter ahead
and four-quarter ahead forecasts. In the latter case, the hypothesis of unbi-
ased expectations is rejected over 38% of the time, despite the fact that the
model embeds within it the hypothesis of rational expectations.
We are also not surprised to discover that when the information friction is
de-activated, the number of rejections decreases. However, we are surprised
to learn that this information friction does not appear to be the main reason
behind the high rejection rate. In particular, the rejection rates in the
complete information environment, while somewhat lower, are nevertheless
considerably larger than 5% as well. Evidently, there is more to the puzzle
than just a Peso problem here. Below, we try to isolate other possible
reasons for why rejections of the null occur so frequently.
6.3 Further Analysis
Upon further investigation we found that the presence of monetary shocks
plays a relatively small role in explaining the high frequency of rejections.
Thus, in what follows, we abstract completely from money shocks (and
hence learning) so that the only source of disturbance is the technology
shock. The results reported below would essentially remain unchanged if we
were to include money shocks and learning.
The most obvious avenue to explore is whether the high rejection rate
is simply a small-sample issue. To investigate this hypothesis, we repeat
21the experiment described above by alternatively considering sample periods
of 80, 160, 250 and 500 periods (20, 40, 62.5 and 125 years, respectively).
Table 3 reports the rejection rates we obtain for 1000 simulations with each
sample period.
Table 3
Rejection Rates for Diﬀerent Sample Periods






The results in Table 3 reveal that sample size certainly does appear to
play a role in inﬂuencing the probability of rejection. However, sample size
does not appear to be the only force at work here. In particular, note that
the frequency of rejections remains signiﬁcantly larger than 5% for very large
samples.
At this stage, we conjecture that the high rejection rate may be somehow
related to what appears to the near nonstationarity of the simulated data.
Under our benchmark calibration, the model is very near I(1), with the
highest eigenvalue equal to 0.9937. This near nonstationarity appears to
arise for two reasons. First, the technology shock exhibits a high degree of
persistence (autocorrelation coeﬃcient equal to 0.95). Second, the relatively
strong response of monetary policy to the output gap appears to contribute
to the ‘instability’ of the model’s dynamics (see Christiano and Gust, 1999).
Table 4 demonstrates how the rejection rate falls as the persistence of the
technology shock (ρ) is progressively reduced (1000 simulations, 80 periods
in length). Note that as the technology shock becomes more transitory in
nature, the rejection rate for the one-quarter ahead forecasts falls close to
the theoretical size of the test. The rejection rate for the year-over-year
forecasts also falls signiﬁcantly, but remains considerably greater than 5%.
22Table 4
Rejection Rates for Diﬀerent Values of ρ






We next evaluate to what extent the monetary policy rule itself con-
tributes to the high rejection rate. Table 5 records how the rejection rate
responds to changes in γ, the parameter that governs the interest rate re-
sponse to changes in the output gap. Once again, the experiment consists
of 1000 simulations, 80 periods in length.
Table 5
Rejection Rates for Diﬀerent Values of γ






For γ =0 , the model’s largest eigenvalue drops from its benchmark value
of 0.9937 to 0.9875. As a result, we see from Table 5 that the rejection rate is
not much diﬀerent than 5% for the one-quarter ahead forecast. On the other
hand, the rejection rate remains fairly high for the year-over-year forecast.
In the last experiment, we examine how the rejection rate varies for
diﬀerent values of λ, the parameter that governs the interest rate response
to changes in the inﬂation gap. Table 5 records the rejection rate values of
λ ranging from 2 to 5. Again, the results are based on 1000 simulations, 80
periods in length.
23Table 6
Rejection Rates for Diﬀerent Values of λ






From Table 6, we see that a more aggressive reaction to the inﬂation
gap results in fewer rejections, presumably because of an induced increase
in the mean-reverting behavior of inﬂation (and inﬂation expectations). The
rejection rate, however, does not appear to be as sensitive to λ as it is to γ
(increasing λ leads to only very small decreases in the system’s largest eigen-
value). Even for high values of λ, the rejection rate remains considerably
above 5%.
7 Summary and Conclusion
Simple econometric tests reported in the literature consistently report that
inﬂation expectations appear to be biased. This ﬁnding is commonly inter-
preted as constituting evidence overturning the hypothesis of rational ex-
pectations. The analysis conducted above casts some doubt on the validity
of such an interpretation.
The main tool utilized in our investigation was a computational dynamic
general equilibrium model capable of generating aggregate behavior similar
to the data along a number of dimensions. By construction, the model em-
bedded the assumption of rational expectations. Standard regressions run on
equilibrium realizations of inﬂation and inﬂation expectations nevertheless
revealed an apparent bias in inﬂation expectations. In these simulations, the
null hypothesis of rational expectations was incorrectly rejected in a large
percentage of cases.
We conjectured that the primary factor behind this high rejection rate
may have something to do with how agents must cope with processing in-
formation when shifts in monetary policy regimes are not directly observ-
24able. Our conjecture proved to be correct in the sense that the rejection
rate for our simulated data was clearly higher when our model agents were
confronted with a signal extraction problem deﬁned over the conduct of
monetary policy. However, even in the absence of any information friction,
the rejection rate remained surprisingly high.
Upon further investigation, it seems that the high rate of rejection may
be attributable to several factors, one of which may be the information fric-
tion alluded to above. But an even more important factor may simply be the
relatively short sample periods utilized by econometricians, in conjunction
with the relatively persistent behavior of inﬂation and inﬂation expectations.
Extending the sample period of simulations and altering the monetary pol-
icy rule to induce less persistence generated far fewer rejections of the null
in the experiments conducted above.
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